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ABSTRACT 
Antoniya Georgieva: A Critical Assessment of EU-Russia Relations: 
 Conflict, Competition, or Consensus? 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine EU-Russian relations from an analytical 
point of view. Due to the changing climate in the European Union and Russia, caused by 
such factors as the EU’s expansion to twenty-seven member states and Russia’s 
establishment of itself as the main European petrol and gas provider, the relationship 
between the two is by necessity now vigorous and essential. This ultimately translates into 
numerous clashes, and competitive situations, but also an effort from the two powers to 
find new effective ways to make the relationship work. This paper aims to discover which 
term - conflict, competition, or consensus - best describes the target relationship and sets 
the tone for the future. Different countries from the EU have established different 
approaches to deal with the Russian superpower. As a result the EU- Russian relationship 
appears to be a combination of all of the above.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
One of the main agendas of the European Union (EU) is to develop a strong strategic 
partnership with the Russian Federation. After the 2004 and 2007 Eastern European 
enlargements, Russia became closer than ever to the EU, sharing 2,257 kilometers of 
common land border with it (Antonenko and Pinnick 2005: 1). However, Russia is not 
only the largest neighbor of the Union, it is also the main actor in geo-political and 
security terms on the global and regional stage. Russia also shares deep historical and 
cultural ties with many of the European countries, which makes it an important player in 
the European arena. The Russian Federation is a key supplier of energy products to the 
majority of the twenty-seven members of the Union. The EU and Russia are each other’s 
dynamic partners for goods and services, as many EU companies are investing in Russia 
and many Russian investors are encroaching on the EU’s markets (European Commission, 
2009:3). 
However, Russia is not always able to keep up with the EU. Since the fall of 
communism Russia has been trying to convert to a ‘European country’, but the extent of 
Russian success has been debatable, which ultimately reflects on EU-Russia relations. 
There are too many examples of issues which question the EU-Russian relationship and  
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the direction it is heading in. There are situations where the two powers appear to be in 
competition, there are numerous conflicts, between the two and it seems as though 
consensus is not even on the EU-Russian agenda. Whether this is the case, or whether 
there is still hope for a solution and long-term partnership, is the subject under discussion 
in this thesis. Are these two great powers capable of leaving their history behind and 
looking ahead to where the light of friendship and cooperation is shining? Will they 
manage to leave behind the dilemma ‘who needs whom more?’ or will they stay stuck 
inside the dark tunnel of self interest and aspiration for power?  
Russia has been widely criticized for its preference into working directly with a single 
EU member state instead of dealing with the EU as a whole. Russia is good at seducing 
the political and economic leaders of the great powers in order to pressure weaker and 
smaller states. However, the EU needs to ask itself if its actions are not contributing in any 
sense to this behavior. Is there anything wrong with the EU’s performance and how can 
the EU make the process of integration between the two smoother? According to 
Konstantin Kosachev, the Chair of the Duma’s International Affairs committee: “…We 
are sick and tired of dealing with Brussels bureaucrats. In Germany, Italy, France, we can 
achieve much more. The EU is not an institution that contributes to our relationship, but 
an institution that slows down progress…” (Leonard and Popescu 2007:20). 
After the fall of communism, Russia struggled with many of the EU’s policies; 
however, today energy-rich Russia sets the pace of EU-Russia relations.  While in the 90’s 
it was common to talk about Russian dependence on western credit, today the talks are 
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about western dependence on Russian gas (Leonard and Popescu 2007:7). Nevertheless, 
the EU continues to outrank Russia in almost all indicators of power. The size of the EU’s 
economy is almost fifteen times bigger than that of Russia. Comparing in terms of 
population and military capabilities it is evident that the EU is again, more powerful 
again.  The EU has over three times the population of Russia, and the EU’s military 
spending is almost seven times greater than that of Russian. 
The unpredictability of EU-Russian relations is another interesting aspect. After 
the fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe, NATO and the EU took an active 
approach towards expansion. At the time no-one realized the role that Russia was about to 
take in the new European order. When either one of the two organizations began the 
process of enlargement it became clear that a new relationship with Russia was necessary. 
There was certainly a need to engage Russia with the EU’s expansion to the east, but at 
the same time the new EU relations with Russia brought about challenges with the new 
member countries. For many of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe a possible EU membership was a symbol of a ‘new beginning away from Russia.’ 
In fact, when the EU started to establish comfortable dialogue with Russia that created a 
certain tension between the EU, Russia and the new member states. 
 So in the early 90s these was an interesting development in EU- Russian relations, 
where the EU found itself in the position of assuring Russia that the EU enlargement was 
not any kind of threat to it. It was definitely an important moment in EU- Russian history, 
with a positive and a promising future development. Though, nothing in EU-Russian 
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relations is easy and natural; that is exactly what makes this topic interesting and 
unpredictable. In mid June, 1994, the first of its kind, the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) was signed between the two powers, where the promotion of 
democratic norms took high priority, together with political and economic freedom and 
international peace and security. This agreement more specifically aimed to advance 
investment, support the reform process in Russia, and to create a future free trade arena 
between the two. 
  Since that point, many other steps have been taken towards a closer and more 
unified Europe, such as the Common Strategy on Europe and the Four Common Spaces. 
However, it is interesting to follow up on the development of a new Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, since the one signed in 1997 was for ten years only. Even though 
the existing PCA will live on automatically in an absence of a new agreement, there are 
many discussions about the possibility of one. A new agreement would possibly give a 
new lease of life to EU-Russian relations, but its likely direction is at present unknown 
(please check –not sure of sense). The priority on signing a new agreement is changing as 
a new EU presidency becomes effective every six months. During France’s EU 
Presidency in 2008, negotiating a new agreement was an important part of the agenda on 
the one hand, but on the other hand, with the breaking crises in the Caucuses it slipped 
from the priority list. During the Czech Presidency it was never a top priority but with the 
gas crises between Russia and the Ukraine, which directly affected many EU countries, 
the importance of the negotiation of a new PCA was lowered. Today a new PCA is still 
  
5 
  
listed on Sweden’s agenda as EU Country of Presidency, but Sweden will not “jettison its 
support for democratic values and human rights to attain it” (Frisell and Oldberg 2009:4). 
Enlargement of the EU is something deeply rooted in the foreign policy of the 
Union; however, enlargement as far east as the Balkans and the Baltic still remains a 
shocking piece of history. There is nothing more interesting and fascinating in EU- Russia 
relations than watching these Eastern European countries coming from a completely 
Russian influence to the absolute reverse  following down the path of reproducing 
Western ways. Since 1989, Russia has been shrinking down while EU has been 
expanding.   
Guide to the Thesis 
This thesis examines EU-Russia relations from an analytical point of view. After a 
brief introduction, the main part of the paper, Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 
5, describes the essential points of EU-Russian relations. Chapter 2 looks at the five 
existing policy approaches of the EU member states towards Russia, in order to explore the 
challenges in finding a single European voice. With numerous examples, the paper outlines 
why a certain country belongs to a certain category, and which areas most impair EU-
Russian relations. Chapter 3 illustrates the fundamental differences between the two 
parties, while at the same time putting an accent on the rising conflicts. Chapter 3 goes 
further with its analysis by categorizing the reasons behind the conflicts into three popular 
approaches. This section continues with the suggestion that competition might be visible in 
EU-Russian relations, especially in the Russian attempt to establish bilateral relations with 
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countries from the Union instead of with the Union as a whole. Chapter 4 follows the 
existing theoretical efforts for partnership between the two powers. There are two major 
cooperation and partnership agreements between the two, and Chapter 4 aims to explain 
their agendas, successes, and failings. It also focuses on the changes since the days the 
agreements were established and outlines the need for a new direction in EU-Russian 
relations. Chapter 4 also explores the bright site of EU-Russia relations, where progress 
and positive integration between the two powers has been achieved. Chapter 5 continues 
with a theoretical explanation of the EU’s decision-making process. The last section of the 
body of this study, Chapter 6, details reflections and future outlooks on the subject. The 
conclusion, Chapter 7, presents the awareness that there is not a clear picture of conflict, 
competition, or consensus in EU-Russian relations, but rather, one which is a combination 
of all of the above components.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
DIFFERENT EU MEMBER STATES’ APPROACHES TO RUSSIA 
Different countries from the EU have different history, understanding and policy 
approaches towards Russia. It is important to understand all the different approaches in 
order to understand how complex and difficult is it for the EU to have common voice 
towards its largest neighbor, Russia. According to the European Council on Foreign 
Relations (ECFR) there are five different policy approaches that best describe the 
relationship between Russia and a European Union member state. For Example, the 
approach that best describes the relationship between Greece and Cyprus and Russia is 
‘Trojan Horses’ because of their willingness to defend Russian interest in the EU, and, 
when needed, to veto certain EU proposals. However, countries such as France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain have chosen to keep ‘Strategic Partnerships’ positions in  order to enjoy 
certain benefits that go beyond EU policies. ‘Friendly Pragmatists’ are countries such as: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, 
and Slovakia and these have chosen to keep their business interests as a core factor of 
their relations with Russia. The fourth category are the ‘Frosty Pragmatists’, which also 
put their business interests first, but in addition openly criticize areas that Russia needs to
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work on. The most controversial issue is the human rights issue, and countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom have expressed their concerns numerously in the past. The last 
category is the most controversial group, captured in the bold name of this group -‘New 
Cold Warriors.’ Countries that belong to the ‘New Cold Warriors’ are Lithuania and 
Poland, and they are the least tolerant towards Russia from all the countries from the 
Union. 
‘Trojan Horses’ 
The aggressive actions of the Ottoman Empire, and later on of Turkey, have 
played a significant role in explaining why today countries from the Balkans are in the 
‘Trojan Horses’ category. Russia has been a main defender of Greece in its battles with 
Turkey in the past, and the main provider of military equipment. Also, all the countries 
from the Balkans are completely reliant on Russia’s energy sources, which put further 
pressure on them to keep Russian interests at heart. Bulgaria and Russia also have a 
history of long-lasting partnership for almost the same reasons as Russia and Greece. 
Firstly, Russia helped Bulgaria win their independence back from Ottoman rule in the 19th 
century, after five hundred years. Secondly, Bulgaria is completely reliant on Russia’s 
supplies of energy and during the December 2008- January 2009 energy disputes, between 
Russia and the Ukraine, parts of Bulgaria lost power for over three days. However, after 
forty-five years of communism and close Russian influence, today we see a Bulgaria that 
is trying to put Russia behind it and focus on its democratic future with the Union and 
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protection through NATO, while trying to keep ‘Friendly Pragmatic’ relations with its 
‘former best friend.’ In the case of Cyprus, Russia has been a firm supporter of the 
Cypriot position in the conflict over North Cyprus. For that matter, Cyprus usually 
follows the Greek approach to Russia (Leonard and Popescu 2007:27). It is also one of the 
leading investors in Russia, ahead of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
‘Strategic Partnership’ 
 Big powers such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain all belong to this next group 
‘Strategic Partnership’. Many of them have a record of a bilateral relationship with Russia 
- with a prime example being France (Leonard and Popescu 2007:32). The reason for that 
is France’s ambition to strengthen its international relations with Russia. Another area 
where the two powers cross is in the area of opposition towards US domination. Even 
though France is not dependent on Russian energy sources that is definitely an area where 
France wants to extend its interests, and the recent Gazprom deal to develop the Shtokman 
gas field confirms those intentions. Although the France-Russia relationship never 
represented a strong economic partnership, that is not so in the case of Germany. The 
economic benefits have been, historically, essential for German- Russian relations. The 
two powers had strong economic ties before the First World War, throughout the war 
period, and during and after the Cold War. The trade partnership between the two is also 
on the up, with the remarkable sum of $55.5 billion in 2005. Russia is Germany’s main 
gas supplier; almost 50% comes from Russia. An important development in the energy 
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sector is the Nord Stream pipeline which aims to provide Germany with gas directly from 
Russia through the Baltic Sea. 
Russia’s biggest trade partners are: Germany, China, and Italy. Since Italy is one 
of the “Strategic Partners’ it is important to discuss Italy’s relations with Russia. During 
Silvio Berlusconi’s presidency, strong economic ties were established with Putin’s Russia; 
however, later on during  Romano Prodi’s presidency they have ended in effect - with one 
exception, the energy links. Today Italy is heavily dependent on Russian gas, which 
accounts for more than 30 % of supplies. There is also a current project between the two 
countries, the South Stream, that is projected to build pipelines under the Black Sea. 
The last country from this category, Spain has very poor links with Russia. The 
two powers have been very careful with each other and ‘respectful’ is the best way to 
describe their ties at the moment. The two countries have minimum trade interaction - less 
than 1% - and Spain is not dependent on Russia’s gas. For that matter, Spain supports full 
ownership of EU energy companies, something that countries as Germany, France, 
Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Austria are against. 
‘Friendly Pragmatists’ 
The countries that belong to the ‘Friendly Pragmatists’ group are mostly small 
member states such as: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Portugal. They take Moscow’s interests into consideration 
and try to avoid confrontations (Leonard and Popescu 2007:36). Economic opportunities 
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are the core of the relationship between this group of countries and Russia; many of these 
small member states are also very interested in deepening their ties with the Russian giant 
Gazprom, since they are heavily reliant on Russia’s gas (specifically Austria, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Slovenia.) Bulgaria in particular seeks specific ties with the 
Russian company “Lukoil,” which generates high percentage of Bulgarian GDP (over 
5%.) Bulgaria is also expecting to be an important partner in the South Stream through the 
Black Sea. Slovakia is in a similar situation as Bulgaria. It is almost 100% reliant on 
Russian gas and oil, which leaves no choice for Slovakia but to support the Russian point 
of view in the EU. Hungary does not have as strong relations with Russia as Bulgaria and 
Slovakia, but economic deals in the sphere of energy securities are bringing them closer. 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia tend to support a stronger political role for the EU in the 
Eastern neighborhood than other countries from this category. Countries such as Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Portugal do not have dependency on Russian gas, which lowers the 
priority of their relations.  
‘Frosty Pragmatists’ 
‘Frosty Pragmatists’ are countries that are questioning Russia’s democracy and 
human rights record in a diplomatic manner, in order to keep their favorable business 
connections with Russia (Leonard and Popescu 2007:42). Countries that belong to that 
group, who are free to express their concerns,  are: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, and one of the big powers, the United 
Kingdom. The United Kingdom used to belong to the group above, ‘Strategic 
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Partnership’, but after the clash between the two countries caused by the 2003 refusal of 
the UK to extradite the oligarch Boris Berezovsky back to Russia, the newly established 
relationship between Russia and the UK fell apart. Russia later on, in 2007, acted similarly 
by refusing to extradite to the UK the main suspect in the murder of Alexandr Litvinenko, 
a Russian immigrant in London. As a result of this described tension, the relationship 
between Russia and the UK took a huge turn for the worse, and the strategic partnership 
that existed before was replaced with heavy suspicion.  Denmark also got affected due to a 
similar dispute when the Chechen leader, Akhmen Zakaev, was arrested in Copenhagen 
but was not extradited to Russia. Later on the Chechen leader moved to the UK which 
contributed further to UK-Russia mistrust. 
Two of the Baltic States belong also to this category: Latvia and Estonia. Russia 
and the Baltic States have a long-lasting history behind them and neither one of them is 
willing to put it aside - and that is what appears to be the crux of their relations. One 
recent example worth studying in this context is the sixtieth anniversary of the end of 
WWII on 9 May 2005, which was commemorated as ‘victory day’ in Moscow, and to 
which Russian President Putin invited heads of state and government from around the 
world, including the presidents of the three Baltic States.  This invitation put the latter 
group of leaders in a difficult situation as this day for the Baltic nations, marks the 
continuation of foreign occupation of their countries.  As Lithuanian President Valdas 
Adamkus remarked, 9 May 1945 meant “we traded Hitler for Stalin”.  Confronted with a 
difficult decision, Latvian President Vike Freiberga decided in January 2005 to accept the 
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invitation, whereas the Estonian and Lithuanian presidents decided to stay away. A closer 
look at the decision-making process of the Baltic presidents reveals many levels on which 
European politics today are closely linked to questions of collective memory, history and 
culture. In this case, Russia managed to keep good relations at least with Latvia, but that 
does not necessarily mean that they do not have tension between them. Even though 
Latvia managed to ratify its border agreement with Russia and Estonia did not, Latvia was 
still under a lot of pressure when the oil supplies to Latvia were cut off at the end of 2008. 
Sweden appears to be a main voice when discussing negative Russian 
development in the areas of Russian domestic and foreign policies. At the moment its 
main concerns are about using the international waters of the Baltic Sea to build North 
Stream-pipelines that will directly connect Russia with Germany. In 2007, Poland and the 
Czech Republic gave permission to the United States to locate a missile defence shield 
against Iran, on their territories. Russia was completely dissatisfied with these actions and 
threatened to establish a military base in Kaliningrad and to point missiles at Prague and 
Warsaw. Romania is another country from this group and it has often criticized Russian 
energy policies. Romania is not dependent on Russian energy supplies; it has its own 
natural resources that completely meet the needs of the country. Romania is also openly 
raising the issue with Moldova, a weak country vitally dependent on Russia.  
Just like Cyprus, the Netherlands has established strong economic relationship 
with Russia, and its concerns about Russian human rights issues are often very lightly 
expressed in order not to jeopardize trade and economic benefits. The countries from this 
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group are almost always afraid to express their real concerns, in order to keep smooth 
relationship with Russia (Leonard and Popescu 2007:47). They have a major 
misunderstanding with Russia but choose not to use it proactively, so they can maintain 
their economic and political interests. 
The New Cold Warriors 
Poland and Lithuania are the two countries that belong to The New Cold Warriors 
group. These two countries are the active, critical voice of the EU against Russian 
pressure and manipulation. Poland and Lithuania have huge historical unresolved baggage 
with Russia which always brings the hate between one another into the spotlight. A good 
example is of when “Poland’s government under Jaroslaw Kuczynski blocked EU 
negotiations on a new EU treaty with Russia after Russia introduced a ban on Polish meat 
and the EU was slow to deal with the problem”(Leonard and Popescu 2007:50). Lithuania 
on the other hand tries to stay away from any possible irritations and unilateral disputes. 
Lithuania is heavily dependent on Russia’s energy sources, which softens the relationship 
in some respects. Since there is a new government in Poland the tension between the two 
is also mellowing, which suggests that these two countries might be exiting this last 
category, New Cold Warriors and moving towards the less controversial, as ‘Frosty 
Pragmatists’ (Leonard and Popescu 2007:50). 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
RISING CONFLICTS AND POSSIBLE COMPETITION 
Four Main Conflicting Dispositions  
EU-Russia relations are characterized by the permanent presence of conflicting 
dispositions. During Putin’s second term as president of the Russian Federation, EU- 
Russian relations reached a predicament. Indeed, there were several actions that directly 
led to a criss situation between the two parties. During 1999, Russia initiated its second 
operation against the separatist rebellion in the Chechen Republic.  Even though Russia 
always insisted that the situation in Chechnya was a domestic matter, the EU believed that 
by signing the PCA and other international agreements, that make the Chechnya matter an 
international one. The EU was highly critical of the launch of the second war against 
Chechnya in 1999.  The EU Council made a declaration that accused Russia of attacking 
Chechen cities and crossing the line of human rights, rule of law and nuclear safety.  As a 
result of these actions, Russia received strong disapproval and suffered the suspension of 
all EU financial and technical support in the area of science and technology. The lack of 
resolution of the situation in Chechnya and Russia’s difficult political processes provided 
European politicians with an opportunity to criticize Russia; however, instead they should 
have looked at the situation as an opportunity to show their worth on defending
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democratic norms and human rights. If the EU fails to make the situation in Russia better, 
then the Union will be a symbol of nothing more than an economic community with a few 
policing functions (Antonenko and Pinnick 2007:63). Both sites have plenty to work on; 
Russia needs to meet the obligations promised when it signed the PCA and to establish an 
appropriate system of interaction with the EU, while the EU needs to start to treat Russia 
as an equal strategic partner. In that situation, Russia would stop seeking independent 
bilateral solutions that represent personal interest, not EU interest. 
Secondly, the 2003 arrest and the controversial prosecution of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the CEO of the oil company Yukos, were highly unpopular in European 
public opinion. Khodorkovski’s arrest and that of several high-profile business executives 
showed that in Russia, “the law of power is still stronger than the power of law” 
(Antonenko and Pinnick 2007:128). The ‘rule of law’ was questioned in Russia and 
showed clear “lack of commitment of Russian authorities to the liberal market economy” 
(Prozorov 2006:7). Putin’s illiberal and authoritarian regime contributed further to the 
EU-Russian conflict.  The removal of Eduard Shevardnadze, the Georgian President, from 
power and the controversial elections of Viktor Yushenko in the Ukraine, were both 
viewed by the EU as highly negative and unacceptable features of Russian foreign policy. 
As a result, at the end of 2005, EU-Russian relations had moved to a “condition of mutual 
suspicion and the attribution of hostility” (Prozorov 2006:8). 
 Thirdly, a major issue in EU-Russia relations has been the bilateral approach, on 
the Russian side, to deal with the EU. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, which greatly divided 
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Europe itself (letter of eight,) forced even further apart EU-Russian relations. Russia’s 
relations with the EU became less important, and its foreign policy changed to establish 
bilateral relations with each country in Europe and more specifically the three big powers, 
France, Germany and the UK. EU-Russia relations cannot be understood without 
monitoring bilateral relations. During the years 2003- 2008, a clear division between 
member states became evident over the EU Eastern European enlargement, the war in 
Iraq, the ‘Orange Revolution, and the energy crises. Countries from the “New Cold 
Warriors” group wanted the EU “to develop its discourse and action,” while the “Strategic 
Partners” wanted Russia “to accept long lasting compromises” (Gotmart 2008: 13).  
Lastly, the escalating source of conflict between the two powers became also 
evident in the recent development in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where Russia was  
more willing to deal with France in its role as holder of the EU presidency , rather than 
with the Czech Republic (France's successor in the next six-month period). However, 
during the Georgian conflict, even though there was a wide division between  new and old 
member states on a number of issues, the members seemed to have reached consensus on 
a type of power (soft versus hard) towards resolving the Georgian crises. “Most member-
states and voters prefer the EU's concentration on soft power (based on the attraction and 
projection of the union's values) rather than hard power (based on military action and 
projection of force) - if it is feasible” (Gillespie 2008:4). It is important to comprehend 
that today we live beyond the era of the Cold War and Russia nowadays is viewed more as 
a regional rather than a global power.  
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 During the Georgian crisis Russia chose to behave as a 19th-century power to 
reinforce its pride and inject fear into its former ‘servant.’ That is not a sustainable policy, 
but it is more understandable as a transitional one that grows out of the humiliating 1990s. 
Even though Russia appears to be much more confident and powerful thanks to its energy 
wealth, Russia's economy is still only 7% of that of the United States and the European 
Union. “All this suggests that the EU needs to develop a long-term response that takes full 
account of political mistakes made by its own members, separately and collectively, in 
managing relations with Russia during Vladimir Putin's presidency. Its leverage is more 
political and economic than military; but security looms large in both dimensions” 
(Gillespie 2008:4). 
Three Approaches That Help in Understand the Conflicting Dispositions 
There are many conflict situations that challenge EU-Russia relations and above 
are just some examples that demonstrate the different worlds that EU and Russia reside in. 
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the above conflicts are just symptoms of a 
seriously ‘ill’ Russia and the EU is ‘the new kid on the block’ that does not know how to 
help its neighbor. The EU is new in its relations with the Eastern European world and the 
organization itself is lacking experience that could possibly smooth out the differences 
between the two. In general, there can be seen to be  at least three approaches that could 
lead us to possible understanding of the conflict situations between the EU and Russia 
(Prozorov 2006:11). 
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The first one is the ‘liberal approach’ and the possibility of Russia becoming 
European in order to enter Europe. Russia has undergone a number of liberal reforms 
failures in domestic politics, which questions its achievements and ability to work with the 
political, economic and social operations practiced by the EU. Russia’s foreign policy is 
viewed as “self-defeating” and “isolationist” (Prozorov 2006:12), which gives it no choice 
but to start changing its image with serious internal reforms such as: the abolision of 
military mobilization and decentralization of local government. According to the ‘liberal 
approach’ the conflict between the EU and Russia is viewed as Russia’s incapability to 
complete domestic liberal reforms that would bring the East and the West naturally closer. 
The second approach that talks about serious conflict between the two is the 
‘institutional approach.’ In this view of things, the conflicting dispositions appear to be 
due to the fact that an institutional format of interaction is established without effective 
communication between the EU and Russia. Communication is the single most important 
factor in avoiding misunderstanding and in fact the two parties are lacking in this respect. 
That leads on to the third interpretation that explains the conflict between the EU and 
Russia, the ‘cultural approach.’ This final approach talks about the “deep-seated 
substantive cultural” divergence between the two powers that makes the occurrence of 
conflict “inevitable and therefore unpuzzling” (Prozorov 2006:14). 
There are still people who live with Cold War ambitions and believe that Russia is 
targeting political isolation and political domination. The examples above show that 
Russia clearly does not aim at symbiotic relations with the formal Soviet Republics of: 
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Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus, and that Russia’s relations with the world began to be 
viewed as ‘friend-enemy.’ Many politicians in Russia feel as the EU is if “characterised 
by a Russophobic [anti-Russian] disposition” (Prozorov 2006:9) and is looking at Russia 
with suspicion and apprehension. As a result of this perceived disposition Russia is treated 
more and more with caution and distrust. As response, Russia is looking to strengthen 
itself domestically and internationally. The growing incompatibility of the EU and 
Russia’s political position has become more and more evident, which logically 
complicates the communication between the two; EU-Russian relations starting to look 
more competitive. “Today the EU-Russian relations are at a stage of deep stagnation and 
EU structures are perceived in Russia as alien and hostile.” (Prozorov 2006:9). 
It is still a very vulnerable spot, the fact that many countries from the East and 
Central Europe, such as: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland etc., who after forty-
five years of Soviet influence, have chosen the road of European Union integration. These 
Eastern countries are slowly but persistently moving towards the other side of the 
continent with more and more links to the West. However, the fact that former Soviet 
Republics such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have chosen full European Union 
membership and full isolation from Russia further aggravates, but in a way justifies, 
Russian’s reach for power and competition on the European stage.  
Eastern European integration is viewed largely as an area of competition. At the 
beginning of the 90s EU enlargement was viewed as a beneficial process in line with 
Russia’s own visions of integration into Europe. However, in the aftermath of the Kosovo 
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operation and Chechnya war, Russian integration into the EU became a utopian idea. 
Although qualification for membership should be linked to proven observation of the 
Council of Europe's democratic and legal standards, accession should be open in principle 
to all countries across greater Europe - including the Russian Federation (Antonenko and 
Pinnick 2005:1). The opportunity has been missed to initiate and reach such as position 
over the last eight years and it will be much harder now that the Georgian crisis has 
hardened attitudes all round. So, a situation of competition and ambition for power has 
been created. 
Energy politics is another area where Russia does not hesitate to show who the 
powerful one is. Between 1992 and 2006, there were more than fifty-five identified 
instances of energy cut offs or threatening of cut offs by Russia. Russia offered ‘technical 
difficulties’ as an explanation of all occurring cut-offs; however, the records indicate that 
all the cases happened exactly at times when Russia was targeting economical or political 
agendas. Recent events concerning the energy cuts-off between the Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation put the Union consistently under pressure. Naturally, Russia tends to 
negotiate with member states bilaterally rather than with the EU collectively; that 
confirms again Russia’s ambitions to “play an independent role” in the international arena 
(Prozorov 2006:9).  
Russia’s position on integration is very different to that of the rest of the former 
communist countries. The main agenda remains Russia’s own interests in the global 
environment under the umbrella of greatest possible effectiveness, and turning Russia into 
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part of the ‘new West’ has never been an option, possibility, prospect or likelihood. That 
goal is in itself very hard to achieve, and the line between self-interest and competition 
becomes very thin when trying to implement the above. Every time a new challenge 
comes into the European arena, historical background of mutual competition comes into 
place, and the integration between the two powers becomes questionable.  Self interest 
appears to be the key pattern that forces apart EU-Russian relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
IS CONSENSUS POSSIBLE? 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
The concept of ‘strategic partnership’ launched in the PCA, has been the official 
discourse of EU-Russian relations since 1997.  In brief, the PCA is the legal base of EU 
relations with Russia. Encouragement of economic, political, commercial and cultural 
cooperation between the EU and Russia is the main goal of the PCA.  The agreement 
come into force on 1 December 1997, even though it was signed on 24 June, 1994- four 
years prior, by former president Yeltsin. The delay was as a result of the first war in 
Chechnya. The PCA covers nearly all aspects of EU-Russian trade, and commercial and 
economic relations, and establishes political communication on the highest level.  It also 
influences human rights and the democratic process.  There are three bodies that have 
been established to monitor the implementation of the PCA: the Cooperation Committee 
(CC,) the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC,) and the Cooperation Council 
(CCo.)  The CCo meets at the ministerial level once a year.  The CC, composed of senior 
EU and Russian civil servants, assists the CCo.  The PCC, made up of Members of the EP 
and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, has the authority to make 
recommendations to the CCo.  
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There has been much discussion concerning the need for a new agreement to 
replace the PCA, even though the existing PCA will live on indefinitely in the absence of 
a new agreement.  There are many reasons why a new agreement is needed and that might 
be the souse of many of the EU-Russia misunderstandings. For example, the current 
agreement was negotiated in 1994 between the recently split Soviet Union and an EU in 
its infancy. At the time of negotiations on the PCA in 1994, the EU was undergoing a 
major transformation, from a European Community (EC) to a European Union.  The 
European Union was formally established when the Maastricht Treaty came into force on 
1 November 1993.  Its initial twelve country membership was as follows: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, and United Kingdom.  A year later, after the negotiations of the PCA in 1995, three 
more countries joined the EU: Austria, Sweden, and Finland.  The Maastricht Treaty not 
only created the EU, but also created its pillar structure: European Community (EC), 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA.) 
 However, the EU was not the only European transformation.  Even more 
significant transformation was taking place in the former USSR territory.  During that 
period, Russia undertook a wide range of reforms.  In 1991, former president Yeltsin 
announced that Russia would proceed with “shock therapy” as recommended by the IMF.  
This consisted of three steps: liberalization of prices, stabilization of inflation, GDP and 
unemployment rates, and privatization of state ownership.  This period was characterized 
by a declining GDP of fifty percent, between 1990 and 1995.  According to the World 
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Bank, more than forty percent of the Russian population was living in poverty at the end 
of 1993. 
Over ten years later, we are looking at an entirely different situation regarding the 
EU and Russian arena, but exactly the same tools from over ten years ago (PCA).  Today, 
we see former Soviet republics, such as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and former 
communist Easter European countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Bulgaria, integrating into the Western world and becoming member nations of the EU.  
The EU undertook a major enlargement process and the twelve members in 1994 grew to 
twenty-seven in 2007. Today we have an enlarged EU that has grown over a hundred 
percent since the PCA negotiations.  On one hand, we have a deepened and widened EU 
in 2009; on the other hand, we simultaneously have a stronger and economically stable 
Russia.  The average salary in Russia grew from eighty dollar in 2000 to six hundred and 
forty dollars in 2008.  The poverty level dropped significantly from the 1994 levels of 
forty percent to fourteen percent in 2008.  Another economic indicator that significantly 
improved has been that of unemployment- at a rate of six percent today, compared to 
thirteen percent in 1999.  Russia is the world’s leading natural gas exporter and the second 
leading oil exporter. 
There is one more major difference between the Russia of the 90s and Russia 
today. Back then, Russia was still considered a prospective candidate for EU membership, 
while later that fell completely off the EU’s agenda. That appears to have been a major 
difference since the 90s, and was simultaneously reflected in the 2005 idea of the Four 
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Common Spaces. Russia’s relations to the EU were depicted as:  “ever-closer integration 
without eventual membership” (Prozorov 2006:3). Russia was given a chance to move 
towards a possible process of European integration without participation in the political 
institutions of the EU (Prozorov 2006:3).  
So, knowing the agenda behind what seems to be the obvious makes it easier to 
understand the direction EU-Russian relations are heading in. Even though there are many 
conflicting dispositions, the reason why they appear is that, looking at the bigger picture,   
the two powers are making cooperation work. A great example of the effort put behind  
EU-Russian cooperation is that expressed in the Four Common Spaces.  
Four Common Spaces 
The Four Common Spaces showed the diversity that the two parties were working 
in. The Common Economic Space focuses on: economic integration, regulatory 
convergence, market opening, trade facilitation, infrastructure development, and energy 
dialog. The Common Space in research and education builds on achieving the greater 
integration of Russia, by participation in the Bologna process and the creation of 
possibilities for Russian scholars to participate in EU- funded programs. The project of 
Common Space of freedom, security and justice consists in strengthening cooperation in 
the field of justice and home affairs to tackle the common threats of organized crime, 
terrorism and other illegal activities of a cross border nature. This cooperation is 
envisioned to ultimately lead to the relaxation and abolition of visa regimes between 
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Russia and the EU. Lastly, the establishment of the Common Space of external security 
would result in greater coordination between the foreign policies of the respective parties 
in areas such as: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional military conflicts, 
international terrorism, and so on (Prozorov  2006:4). 
Russia is the main provider to the EU; it provides 50% of the EU’s natural gas and 
20% of its petrol. In that regard, the EU accounts for 78% and 90% of Russia’s exported 
petrol and gas and 75% of Russia’s export revenue depends directly on the EU’s energy 
market (Gomart 2007:10). 
Success Stories: the Cases of Euregio Karelia and Kaliningrad 
Good examples of cooperation and mutual complementation have been seen in the 
cases of Euregio Karelia and Kaliningrad. The two areas are with the most extensive 
border with the EU and has been a examination for post-Cold War security relations 
between Russia and Europe. There have been many challenges in both areas in regards of 
sub-regional initiatives, the achievements and limitations of cross border cooperation 
programs, and the issues raised by the new border regimes with Finland, Poland, and 
Lithuania. 
“The Euregio Karelia project, generally perceived as a success story and an 
exemplary model of EU-Russian relations” (Prozorov 2006:29), shows that consensus and 
positive outcomes are possible. In the 2000 project, Euregio Karelia, in brief, united the 
Russian republic of Karelia and the Finnish provinces of North Ostrobothia, Kainuu and 
  
28 
 
North Karelia, in the effort of achieving stimulation of cross-border integration for 
furthering economic, environmental, tourism and cultural benefits. The aim of the project 
was the implementation of a culture of ‘transparent borders’ in order to make cross-border 
contacts in trade, science, culture and tourism a natural activity in the every day life of the 
border communities. Karelia was an active participant in sub-regional arrangements 
designed to promote ‘soft power’ of security cooperation. Through devoted planning, the 
Euregio Karelia project aimed to “match resources and infrastructure development on both 
sides of the border in joint projects financed on a parity basis; reduce the gap in living 
standards by creating production and service-sector businesses; nurture regional cultural 
uniqueness; foster the development of civil society and democratic institutions; and work 
towards environmental protection” (Antonenko and Pinnick 2005: 158).  
There were implemented number of programs aim to generate a sense of inclusion 
of both side of the border and provide learning models in the areas of regional 
administration, local self government and civil society. However, some resources on the 
Russian side such as: financial, human, and IT have been limiting the effectiveness of the 
project. There also have been criticisms of a lack of a federal strategy for the region to 
engage with international organizations and financial institutions in regional projects 
which enjoy the support of the Russian government. Russia has failed to establish a clear 
policy that would allow Karelia to deepen sub-regional integration. This remains the most 
challenging part of the Euregio Karelia. However, the border between Karelia and Finland 
is well equipped and is enjoying successful border regimes and has been seen as a model 
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of that matter.  
In general there is a strong sense of insecurity coming from the regional elites 
towards Russia’s political, economical, and social instability. More specifically that leads 
to “socioeconomic stratification, the weakness if democratic institutions and civil society, 
and the potential threat of a new authoritarianism” (Antonenko and Pinnick 2005:162). As 
a result Russia is still struggling with economic imbalances, technological stagnation, poor 
health indicators, and not enough employment opportunities for the young generation. 
Other countries from the region also share security concerns and recognize a common 
interest in: “sustaining economic development, preserving social and cultural identity and 
stemming the outflow of young qualified people from the more economically 
underdeveloped border districts” (Antonenko and Pinnick 2005:163). That is why the 
countries from the EU are supporting the development of Euregio Karelia and a broader 
sub-regional framework for development is seen as vital.  
The second success story is the EU’s cooperation with Russia’s region, 
Kaliningrad. The EU enlargement in Eastern Europe led to this Russian area, Kaliningrad, 
being strictly surrounded by EU territory, which made it very difficult for the Russians 
living in this area. The complications came from the fact that the transit of goods and 
people to and from Kaliningrad became almost impossible. As a result, the efficiency of 
border crossings and the socio-economic development of the area have been a top priority 
of the EU and the growth rates in transit volumes suggests that the arrangements between 
the EU and Russia are working successfully. Kaliningrad’s economic growth is higher 
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than the Russian average, since its establishment as an import center for manufactured 
goods from the EU. Recently, in an effort towards improving Kaliningrad’s efficiency, 
major work from the EU has been done in the areas of Kaliningrad’s administrative 
capacity, quality of health care services, intellectual potentials, and cross-border cultural 
exchange (European Commission 2009:23-4). 
However, the positive attitude of EU towards Kaliningrad is already becoming a 
real problem for Poland for example. The country became very attractive destination for 
illegal migrants from Central and South-east Asia, and Kaliningrad appears to be a busy 
corridor on this route. Many travel to Moscow from where they arrive at Kaliningrad my 
air and then they reach Poland by sea without prove of visa. From Poland illegal migrants 
can further travel to any part of the Union. 
Even though there are plenty of negative consequences of the new visa regime, 
Poland’s EU membership should lead to positive impact on Kaliningrad. The EU’s area 
should contribute to stability and prosperity in this Russian region, which ultimately 
should lead to increased interest from investors. The successful development of 
Kaliningrad should not only embrace Kaliningrad but the EU market as well. 
Since the 2004 enlargement, the EU and Russia have been each others’ important 
neighbors and as a result of that they had the challenge of ensuring greater convergence 
and mutual respect. Finding the appropriate strategy is key, in order to overcome each 
others fundamental differences.  However, in order for cooperative relationship and 
consensus to be achieved, the EU and Russia have to focus on the amount of work that is 
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still ahead. On the one hand, the EU is facing the challenge of developing a strong set of 
incentives that promote political and economic reforms in Russia that could bring 
increased convergence between the integrated EU area and its largest neighbor. That 
would have a great impact on all spheres: economical, political, security, and social, 
which would naturally lead to a free trade area, economic benefits, free movement of 
people, better democratic values, and lastly, cooperation in the fight against terrorism and 
organized crime (Antonenko and Pinnick 2005:2).  
On the other hand, Russia is facing the even bigger challenge of attaining 
convergence with the enlarged EU. Russia needs to look at modernizing its ‘strong state 
model’ by pulling away of its authoritarian rule of bureaucracy. The current model is a 
step back towards regional power and does not work with the pluralistic efforts of the EU. 
The 2004 enlargement welcomed many new members, but also new neighbors. After the 
2004 and 2007 Eastern European enlargement, the EU is more than ever open and ready 
to work with its new neighbor. Even though there are many challenges facing both parties, 
working on these obstacles is what is going to pave the way of harmonized EU-Russia 
relations. If they are dettermined and keep working on the differences, consensus will 
come in many areas, just like it did in the case of Euregio Karelia and Kaliningrad. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
STRUCTURE OF THE EU DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
The process of decision making is complex and difficult to pin down, even within 
a single nation state, but it is even more challenging to do so within a system of twenty- 
seven member states - which is the current substance of the EU. It is also important to 
keep in mind that the EU is a new union that is in a process of discovering the appropriate 
distribution of power between its three main institutions: the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. However, the Commission 
is the body that proposes new laws and it is the Parliament and Council that adopt them. 
The EU decision-making process is described in the Treaties, and every proposal for a 
new European law is based on a “specific treaty article, referred to as the legal basis of the 
proposal” (European Union 2009).        
Consultation 
There are three main decision-making procedures - consultation, assent, and co-
decision. Under the first procedure, consultation, the Commission sends its proposal to the 
Council and the Parliament. The Parliament can approve the Commission proposal, reject 
it, or ask for amendments. The Commission needs to take into consideration all the 
changes suggested by the Parliament when the Parliament asks for amendments.
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The EP sends the Council an amended proposal if it accepts any of the changes; next, the 
Council can adopt the amendments, or suggest new ones. There are many areas covered 
by the consultation procedure, such as: police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; 
revision of the treaties; discrimination on the grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, 
religious or political conviction, disability, age or sexual orientation; EU citizenship; 
agriculture; visas; asylum, immigration and other policies associated with the free 
movement of people; transport; competition rules; tax arrangements; economic policy;  
and so on (European Union 2009).      
Assent     
The assent procedure is a procedure where the Council has to obtain the European 
Parliament's agreement before any decisions are taken. However, it is important to know 
that the Parliament cannot amend a proposal in this context: it must either accept it with 
an absolute majority or reject it. The areas covered by the assent procedure are: specific 
tasks of the European Central Bank; amending the statutes of the European System of 
Central Banks/European Central Bank; the Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds; the 
uniform electoral procedure for the European Parliament; certain international 
agreements; accession of new member states; and so on (European Union 2009).          
Co-Decision 
In co-decision, the Parliament shares legislative power with the Council. Firstly, 
the Commission sends its proposal to the Parliament and the Council. Secondly, after 
reading and discussing it, if they cannot reach agreement, it is put before a ‘conciliation 
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committee’, consisting of equal numbers of Council and Parliament representatives, and 
with Commission representatives having a say in the discussion. Once an agreement has 
been reached, the proposal is sent once again to the Parliament and the Council so that 
they can approve it as law. The areas covered by the co-decision procedure are: non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality; the right to move and to reside; the free 
movement of workers; social security for migrant workers; the right of establishment; 
transport; the internal market; employment; customs cooperation; the fight against social 
exclusion; equal opportunities and equal treatment; implementing decisions regarding the 
European Social Fund; education; vocational training; culture; health; consumer 
protection; trans-European networks; implementing decisions regarding the European 
Regional Development Fund; research; the environment; transparency; preventing and 
combating fraud; statistics; setting up a data protection advisory body; and so on 
(European Union 2009).      
There are also some changes in process. Prominent changes include more qualified 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers, increased involvement of the European 
Parliament in the legislative process through extended co-decision with the Council of 
Ministers, eliminating the pillar system, the creation of a President of the European 
Council with the extended term of two-and-a-half years, and a High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs to present a united position on EU policies. If ratified, the Treaty of 
Lisbon would also make the Union’s human rights charter, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, legally binding. As of 31 October 2009, 26 of the 27 member states have ratified 
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the Lisbon Treaty, with only Czech Republic signature remaining before the Treaty can be 
actualized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 6 
REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE OTLOOKS 
Even though conflict and competition have been a major part of EU-Russia 
relations there is definitely a place for consensus, and that needs to take priority. It is 
beneficial for the EU, Russia to operate under liberal democracy rules; however, in its 
effort to accomplish this agenda, the EU is applying enormous pressure to its eastern 
neighbor. This has resulted in a total unwillingness to cooperation on the Russian side, 
and during Putin’s administration it was very difficult to develop a partnership between 
the two powers. Now, with the 2008 election of the new Russian President, Dmitry 
Medvedev, it is time for a new era of partnership, cooperation and agreements. The EU 
should therefore unite around a more balanced relationship with Russia based on a new 
paradigm of promoting the rule of law. The first thing that the European Union must do is 
to examine its own failings. An important part of this strategy should be a commitment 
from member states to make sure that the bilateral relations they conduct with Moscow 
are guided by common European principles.  
The EU needs to find a middle way, between those countries who think they can 
secure a better deal for themselves through bilateral relations, and those states who see 
such contact as a betrayal (for example, Polish politicians have compared the deal on the 
Nordstream pipeline to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact). The goal should be to ensure that 
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bilateral contacts between Russia and individual EU member states reinforce common EU 
objectives. Firstly, to avoid further monopolization in the EU energy market, the European 
Commission could be granted the right to pre-approve big energy deals on long-term 
contracts and pipelines concluded between European and foreign energy companies. The 
aim should be to encourage open competition, respect for the rule of law and an integrated 
and flexible gas market. Secondly, the EU should use negotiations on the new PCA to 
develop a new approach of conditional engagement with Russia. Leaders such as: Gordon 
Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel, and Romano Prodi must redefine their foreign 
politics toward Russia.  
As part of this process, the EU should insist on the implementation of contractual 
obligations and international commitments by Russia. The European Commission should, 
for instance, be given more political support to apply competition policy in the energy 
sector, and to investigate the more dubious deals between Russian and EU companies. 
More generally, the EU should demand the enforcement of the growing number of 
agreements which have not been implemented, such as the PCA and the Four Common 
Spaces. If the EU wants to turn the new Russia into a dependable and cooperative 
neighbor, it must build its partnership with Russia on the same foundations that made 
European integration a success – interdependence based on stable rules, transparency, and 
consensus. But these foundations will not build themselves; the Union must be much more 
determined about agreeing rules of engagement with Russia, and then defending them. 
  
 
CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
 
Russia’s foreign policy is motivated by “power, independence and control,” while 
the EU’s foreign policy stands on the idea of “consensus, interdependence and the rule of 
law” (Leonard, 2007:8). Different foreign policies have different aims; some target 
control, economic interest, and energy asset, while others search to insure human rights, 
economic stability, and democracy. It is clear though that the diplomatic approach needs 
to take high priority in order to achieve a secure European neighborhood because that is 
something that is going to be beneficial for everyone. The two powers have different 
concerns in their foreign policies; however, the one that aims at peacefulness and good 
governance needs to be the dominating one.  
Regardless of the slow development of EU-Russian relations and frustrating 
drawbacks during the second term of Putin‘s presidency, it is still remarkable to be able to 
witness the two powers getting more comfortable and taking into account each other’s 
interests. Only twenty years ago, these two powers were each other’s enemies; today they 
freely discuss opportunities for partnership, such as free trade. It is an amazing inspiration 
to follow how, through disappointment and frustration, these two powers are making 
things work. Even though the pace of progress is slow, a vital network between the two is
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apparent. Most significantly, the EU-Russia summit takes place regularly every six 
months, where the EU Troika meets Russian Counterparts. 
After analyzing in detail EU-Russian relations from the early 90s to the present 
day, it is possible to conclude that consensus remains theoretical and there is a lot more 
work that needs to be done in order to succeed in the effort to make these two powers 
partners. On the one hand the, two powers have very different backgrounds and ways of 
implementing tasks, and it is foolish to believe that Russia is going to change overnight 
and adopt all the EU conditions in order to feel mentally part of Europe. On the other 
hand, the Russian Federation is geographically part of Europe and it’s not going 
anywhere. For this reason, it is critical for the two parties to keep trying to find a common 
language and to start working together, rising above conflicts, looking beyond 
competition. 
Every conflict needs to find a solution in the ‘sea of compromise’; competition 
needs to be avoided and complementation needs to take place instead. Consensus is the 
future and cases such as Karelia and Kaliningrad are the living proof that that goal is 
achievable. However, a new strategy is necessary. The long-term goal, of course, remains 
the same: a liberal, democratic Russia. However, it is essential to set realistic smaller 
goals on the way. That will potentially encourage Russia to become a reliable partner by 
respecting the rule of law. The rule of law is obviously Russia’s weakness, but it is central 
to the European Union. So in order for  EU-Russian relations to pick up, it is critical to 
speak the language of democracy, which can happen naturally by focusing on the rule of 
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law. Russia needs to work on: law effective business, human rights, escape from 
authoritarianism, and avoidance of military intervention. There are many believers in 
democracy in Russia that have lost their faith and it is the European Union’s job to bring 
that faith back by proposing a common strategy that will “use many points of leverage to 
reinforce it” (Leonard and Popescu 2007:9). 
There are plenty of common interests between the two powers; however, there are 
fundamental differences in terms of outlook, approach and objectives, which makes it 
very hard for the two sides to see the full benefit of their cooperation. There is a certain 
fear coming from the EU that a trouble Russia could turn into a security threat, which 
pushes the Union to avoid any kind of competition and focus on mutual understanding. 
Russia can be a major source of organized crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and 
weapons smuggling, and in order to avoid any kind of threat, the EU needs to provide 
close relationship with Russia, which can only come from a close integration with its 
neighbor, the EU. 
Many Russians argue that their country is special and unique, which gives them 
the right to do things the Russian way, not the European accepted way. After all, it is not 
important who needs whom more. Russia needs the EU and the EU needs Russia and that 
should be the connecting bridge between the two instead of looking for monopolistic 
situations in order to manipulate each other. There have been consensus situations in the 
past, there are some today, and that should be the guiding focus when building the road of 
future EU-Russia relations. There are areas where the relationship between the two 
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powers is conflicting and contradictory. There are examples of areas where the 
competitive mode is taking over, but also in areas where the two powers need to 
cooperate, there is a strong enough drive, and enough common ground, to overcome any 
of the challenges that the EU and Russia are facing today or may stumble upon in the 
future. 
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